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 In February 2014, nationwide protests in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) were followed by a 
series of ‘plenums,’ grassroots gatherings of citizens issuing demands of their public officials. 
The novelty of citizen activism in BiH overshadowed a surprisingly stipulation of the plenums: 
the explicit exclusion of NGOs. This paper undertakes to explain the divide that has arisen 
between Bosnian civil society and the local population. Employing the analytic lens of the 
Samaritan’s Dilemma, which posits an inverse relation between the efforts of donors and that of 
recipients, we hypothesize that the presence of assured donor funds prompted recipient NGOs to 
exert lower levels of effort than they otherwise would have. We further hypothesize that lower 
effort will manifest as reduced organizational responsiveness to changing constituent needs. To 
test this hypothesis, the paper explores the process of NGO mission formation and evolution 
through qualitative interviews with a sample of six Bosnian NGOs. Secondarily, we employ a 
more macro approach by tracking the evolution of NGO projects by sector, using projects funded 
by the National Endowment for Democracy as a sample. Our findings disconfirm our hypothesis 
but reveal a plausible alternate explanation which we define as the ‘leaders without followers’ 
phenomenon. Our findings suggest that Bosnian NGOs lack two elements critical to their civil 
society function: a targeted beneficiary group and mechanisms by which to engage a public 
constituency. Consequently, our policy recommendations hinge on the introduction of 
‘community integration’ as a criteria used by donors to evaluate potential grant recipients. In 
expanding their evaluative criteria beyond organization capacity and project viability, donors 
should aim to engage resource-poor, local NGOs in order to promote the dual growth of NGOs 
and civil society, rather than the former at the expense of the latter.  
SAMARITANS AND PATRONS: 
THE LONG ROAD TO CIVIL SOCIETY IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 
 
Jessica B Kuntz, MPIA 
University of Pittsburgh, 2015
 
iii 
 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS  
 
1.0 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 1 
1.1 DONOR FUNDING AND THE RISE OF THE NGO SECTOR .................... 2 
1.2 SOLVING THE PUZZLE: THE SAMARITAN’S DILEMMA ..................... 4 
1.3 METHODOLOGY .............................................................................................. 6 
2.0 ASPIRANT SAMARITANS: DONORS MOTIVATIONS, VISION AND 
STRATEGY IN POST-WAR BOSNIA HERZEGOVINA ..................................................... 10 
2.1 A BRIEF HISTORY OF DONOR ENGAGEMENT IN BIH: VISION AND 
GOALS 11 
2.2 DONOR STRATEGY ....................................................................................... 13 
2.3 DONOR MOTIVATIONS ................................................................................ 17 
3.0 THE NGO PERSPECTIVE: THE MIXING OF MONEY AND MISSION ........ 29 
3.1 NGO FORMATION AND MISSION EVOLUTION IN POST-WAR 
HERZEGOVINA ................................................................................................................ 32 
3.2 BOSNIA’S 99 PERCENT (OF NGOS) ............................................................ 33 
3.3 METHODOLOGY ............................................................................................ 35 
3.4 FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS ........................................................................... 40 
3.4.1 STAYING THE COURSE ......................................................................... 40 
3.4.2 RELUCTANT EVOLUTION .................................................................... 42 
3.4.3 THE CATCHALL MISSION .................................................................... 44 
iv 
 
3.5 SAMARITAN’S DILEMMA AT WORK? ..................................................... 46 
3.6 LEADERS WITHOUT FOLLOWERS ........................................................... 47 
3.7 NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY FUNDED PROJECTS
 49 
4.0 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS .................................. 56 
4.1 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS: EFFECTIVE NGO/DONOR 
PARTNERSHIPS ............................................................................................................... 58 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ....................................................................................................................... 67 
 
v 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1 USAID Development Objectives 2013 Strategic Framework ......................................... 15 
Table 2 Priority Reconstruction and Recovery Program (PRRP) spending breakdown .............. 20 
Table 3 Interviewed NGOs ........................................................................................................... 36 
Table 4 NED Grants to BiH, Statistics ......................................................................................... 50 
Table 5 NED funded projects 2012 .............................................................................................. 51 
Table 6 NED funded projects 2008 .............................................................................................. 52 
Table 7 NED funded projects 2002 .............................................................................................. 52 
Table 8 NED funded projects 1996 .............................................................................................. 53 
vi 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1 Official Development Aid (ODA) to BiH ...................................................................... 22 
Figure 2 Year to Year Flucuation in ODA to BiH ........................................................................ 23 
Figure 3 2005 ODA by Sector ...................................................................................................... 24 
Figure 4 2013 ODA by Sector ...................................................................................................... 25 
Figure 5 US & EU Aid to BiH, 1995-2012 .................................................................................. 26
vii 
 
1.0  INTRODUCTION 
In February 2014, a series of spontaneous protests erupted in cities throughout Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. When the initial violence died down, citizens of all ethnicities gathered to voice 
their frustrations, formulating lists of demands that included the resignation of local government 
officials, the establishment of an expert-led government and the reexamination of privatization 
deals. From the start, these gatherings, described by participants as “plenums,” explicitly 
prohibited the participation of NGOs. Given that NGOs are traditionally conceived of as the link 
between citizens and government, this exclusion clearly indicates that something is amiss with 
the development of civil society in the country.  
The importance of civil society to democracy has long been emphasized by political 
theorists and development professionals alike; as Michael Ignatieff writes of Eastern Europe’s 
post-communist transition, “without civil society, democracy remains an empty shell.”1 This 
assertion lies at the heart of the dual-pronged democratization strategies employed in post-
communist Europe, which at once encompassed democratic institutions and a civil society. “A 
civil society strategy,” Ignatieff goes on to say, “starts with the search for partners outside the 
state, the leading parties, and the bureaucracy. A civil society strategy, in other words, assumes 
that formal democracy is not enough.”2 In order to play the role of conduit between individual 
citizens and government institutions, civil society organizations must maintain the public’s trust.  
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Bosnian civil society appears to have lost the public’s trust. In a 2012 public opinion poll 
conducted by the UN Development Programme (UNDP), respondents were asked “Who do you 
believe may be the catalysts for positive changes in the country?” A mere 15.3% of respondents 
in the Federation and 7.9% in the Republika Srpska (RS)3 placed their faith in civil society 
organizations. These numbers display an even lower level of public trust in civil society than in 
government (16.9% & 28.5%) or politicians (17.5% & 20.8%). In a country where politicians are 
widely thought to be self-interested and government more of a bureaucratic hindrance than a 
help, this is a rather dire comparison. Tellingly, the largest majority placed their faith in ‘citizens 
in general’ (48.6% & 55.7%) and youth (69.8% & 55.1%).4 The high levels of trust in one’s 
metaphorical fellow citizen, concurrent with disillusionment with organizations that presumably 
represent those citizen interests, present us with a puzzle. From where does this disconnect 
between civil society and the local population derive?  
1.1 DONOR FUNDING AND THE RISE OF THE NGO SECTOR  
I posit that NGO disengagement from the public is a partial, albeit unintended, consequence of 
donor engagement. One cannot overstate the importance of the donor community in Bosnia’s 
post-war reconstruction. Between 1996 and 2014, the international community invested nearly 
12 billion dollars into the reconstruction of Bosnia, meaning that the nation received more per 
capita aid than did any country under the Marshall Plan.  They rebuilt roads and schools, trained 
elected officials in the basics of democratic governance and even dismissed obstructionist 
government officials.  In their engagement with NGOs, the donors provided project funding, 
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training and exchanges, all in the hopes of planting the seeds of civil society in the embryonic 
nation. Numerically, the donors’ support of civil society produced staggering results: by 2009, 
there were a remarkable 12,189 registered organizations in the country.   
Unfortunately, such a headcount is misleading. While abundant in quantity, the quality of 
NGOs – their sustainability, impact and the extent to which they address community needs – is a 
metric of far greater interest and relevance. In efforts to explain the shortcomings of Bosnian 
NGOs, international and Bosnian critics alike have enumerated the failures of donor strategy. 
Donor preference for funding individual projects, rather than providing core programmatic 
funding, is rightly perceived as an obstacle to organizational sustainability. Ever-shifting donor 
priorities require the NGOs to follow the money, jumping from project to project and sector to 
sector. Writing in 2002, McMahon offers a particularly scathing criticism:  
Starting in 1996, the international community basically threw a lot of money into 
the field, with little thought behind what it was doing. Numerous non-governmental 
organizations were created, but because there was no coherent strategy, a great deal of 
money has been wasted, many of the local NGOs have since collapsed, and the remaining 
ones are vulnerable to the changing whims of donors. Because the international 
community wants to help but does not have a strategic vision of how to do so, NGO 
representatives in Bosnia are confused and frustrated in their effort to balance changing 
international priorities with local needs and interests. At least for the time being, local 
NGOs are forced to think about international priorities first and domestic needs second. 
Instead of creating a robust civil society that can facilitate democratization, the 
international community has fostered a dependent society that has little to do with 
domestic politics.5 
 
Given the lofty nature of their goal, it seems nearly certain that donors have fallen short 
of aspirations. Individual strategies and levels of coordination are imperfect. However, the 
pervasive “the international community is to blame” rhetoric is not only more self-therapeutic 
than productive, it overlooks one half of the equation. We propose, therefore, to look at the other 
half of the problem, specifically the role of the NGOs in the observed disconnect. In this context, 
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we will examine in greater detail the behavior of the NGOs. We ask the following question: How 
have local NGOs altered their behavior in response to donor aid?  
 
1.2 SOLVING THE PUZZLE: THE SAMARITAN’S DILEMMA 
Our analytical lens is the Samaritan’s Dilemma, which posits an inverse relation between the 
efforts of donors and that of recipients. In other words, the donor, in an effort to do good, 
unintentionally changes the incentive structure of the recipient such that the recipient behaves 
differently than he otherwise would have. In the system of behavioral economics, donor and 
recipient face the following payoffs, in which 1 represents the outcome least desirable to the 
actor and 4 represents his optimal outcome. For example, the donor wants to achieve an engaged 
and active civil society (4) rather than an ethnically divided or apathetic society (1). Meanwhile, 
the recipient would most like to see meaningful change in his area of focus (4), as opposed to 
backpedaling on the issue (1). 
     RECIPIENT 
 
      High effort         Low effort 
 
DONOR           No aid 
     Aid  
  
2, 2 1, 1 
4, 3 3, 4 
4 
 
 Knowing that the donor will provide aid, the recipient faces the choice between exerting 
high or low effort. Given the payoffs outlined above, the recipient opts for the latter. Absent the 
donor (no aid scenario), the recipient faces the same choice: high or low effort? In this case, the 
recipient opts to exert high effort, thereby maximizing his payoff. The donor is faced with a 
quandary: assuming he is committed to giving aid (in accordance his good Samaritan 
tendencies), how can he incentivize the recipient of said aid to exert high effort? That is, how can 
he overcome the above incentive structure?  
The Samaritan’s Dilemma has been used in policy debates to argue against social welfare 
benefits and charity. For instance, the claim that unemployment benefits discourage the recipient 
from seeking work relies on the behavioral logic of the Samaritan’s Dilemma. On a global scale, 
the argument has been applied to explain the failure of international aid to achieve its goals. If 
provided food aid, a local government has less incentive to invest in agriculture R&D or an 
improved national irrigation system that would boost yields and food security. Previous research 
has found that “unrestricted transfers induce people to diminish ex-ante protection activities 
(charity hazard) and to shirk responsibilities.”6 
Beginning in 1996, the international community sought to assure stakeholders of their 
long-term commitment to BIH through repeated statements and a heavy physical presence. 
Bosnia as a single, undivided state was a long-term, rather than temporary, solution. Ethnically 
minded Croat or Serb politicians who might contemplate division were warned to align their 
behavior with Western rhetoric. Even today, the secessionist threats of RS President Milorad 
Dodik are firmly rejected by representatives of the international community: The division of 
Bosnia will not be permitted. These public guarantees, made to keep national politicians in line, 
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effectively turned the donor/aid recipient relationship into a repeated game, one in which the 
recipients were confident that the donors would continue to provide aid.   
1.3 METHODOLOGY 
Unfortunately, we cannot travel back in time and remove the donors in order to see how NGOs 
would have behaved in their absence. Nor can we expect recipients to reveal that they have 
invested lesser effort in response to donor aid. As such, we must rely on other types of evidence 
to evaluate whether and how recipients have adjusted their behavior. For this, we turn to the 
concept of NGO mission evolution. 
To illustrate mission evolution, consider an NGO initially created to support victims of 
wartime rape. As the initial need is met and/or new issues arise, the same organization is likely to 
either (1) shift or expand its activities to address other women’s’ issues (e.g., domestic violence); 
or 2) close its doors. Arguably, an NGO ought to be responsive to changing community needs. If 
the core problem it addresses is significantly reduced, the organization must either evolve or 
cease to be relevant. Mission evolution is a natural occurrence, particularly in the context of a 
rapidly changing post-war environment.  
If the model of the Samaritan’s Dilemma is valid in the Bosnian case, I would expect 
NGOs receiving donor aid to change their behavior in response to the assured presence of said 
external funding. Specifically, I expect those NGOs to respond by exerting lower levels of effort 
than they would have absent donor funds. This behavioral shift would not necessarily be 
apparent in a reduced quality or quantity of programs, as greater access to resources would 
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obviously enable the elite NGOs to pursue programs of greater scale and visibility. I hypothesize 
that the NGOs’ change in behavior would be visible as a reduced responsiveness to changing 
constituent needs, which signifies a slower rate of mission evolution. It is through this lens that I 
will endeavor to explain the NGO-community divide visible in Bosnian society. 
In order to gauge mission evolution, we rely on multiple methods including interviews 
conducted with the leadership of the following six Bosnian NGOs: Centar za istrazivacko 
novinarstvo (Center for Investigative Reporting), Centar za okolišno održivi razvoj (Centre for 
Environmentally Sustainable Development), Centar za životnu sredinu (Center for the 
Environment), Centar za postkonfliktna istraživanja (Post-Conflict Research Center), PRONI 
Centar za omlaldinski razvoj Brčko (PRONI Center for Youth Development in Brčko) & Youth 
Initiative for Human Rights Sarajevo (YIHR). These organizations represent a range of sectors 
including environmental protection, post-conflict reconciliation, economic development and 
government transparency.  
As an alternate measure, we trace the concentration of NGO projects by sector and over 
time, using projects funded by the National Endowment for Democracy as a sample. This 
approach endeavors to capture the evolution of NGOs’ focus on an aggregate, national level, as 
opposed to dissecting the micro-level internal process of an individual NGO. 
The remainder of this paper will proceed as follows: 
o Chapter 2 examines the goals and motives of our Samaritans, the international donor 
community, in funding Bosnian NGOs. We provide a brief history of the international 
community’s engagement in post-war BiH and trace the evolution of donor goals over 
time (1996 – present), as well as the mechanisms employed to reach said goals. We also 
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identify important trends in donors’ aggregate aid, shifting sectoral focus and the relative 
importance of different donors. 
o Chapter 3 identifies factors that generally shape an NGO at its founding, determining 
how Bosnian NGOs differ from the general pattern. The chapter proceeds by reviewing 
the factors that typically drive the evolution of an NGO’s mission and compares this 
pattern with the situation observed in Bosnia. The second half of this chapter contains the 
bulk of the paper’s analysis, exploring qualitative data garnered from NGO interviews 
and a sector-by-sector breakdown of National Endowment for Democracy funded 
projects, to evaluate the validity of the Samaritan’s Dilemma hypothesis and offer 
alternative explanations. 
o Chapter 4 summarizes research findings and offers policy recommendations for foreign 
donors and NGOs. Extrapolating from the Bosnian case, the recommendations provide 
models for creating donor/NGO partnerships that are well positioned to foster civil 
society in emergent democracies and authoritarian regimes around the world. 
This research will evaluate the relevance of the Samaritan’s Dilemma in shaping the 
behavior of Bosnian NGOs. In so doing, my aim is to shed light on the underlying causes of the 
divide between Bosnian NGOs and the community they are ostensibly committed to serve.  I will 
conclude by offering policy recommendations that promise to span the divide. 
1 Ignatieff, Michael. On Civil Society: Why Eastern Europe's Revolutions Could Succeed, Foreign Affairs March/April 1995. 2 Ibid. 3 The country of BiH is divided into two geographic and governing Entities: the Federation of Bosnia Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska (RS). The former is predominately populated by Bosniaks and Croats, while the latter is majority Serb. Bosniaks are generally accepts to be Slavic Muslims. 
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4 Public Opinion Poll Reports Analitical (sic) Report. Prism Research for the Office of the UN Resident Coordinator in Bosnia & Herzegovina. 2013. http://www.un.ba/upload/documents/Prism%20Research%20for%20UN%20RCO_Statistical%20report.pdf  5 McMahon, Patrice. What Have We Wrought? Assessing International Involvement in Bosnia, Problems in Post-Communism, vol. 49, no. 1 January/February 2002 pp. 18-29. 6 Raschky, Paul A & Manijek Schwindt. Aid, Natural Disaster and the Samaritan’s Dilemma. The World Bank. Policy Research Working Paper 4952. June 2009. 
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2.0  ASPIRANT SAMARITANS: DONORS MOTIVATIONS, VISION AND 
STRATEGY IN POST-WAR BOSNIA HERZEGOVINA 
The Samaritan’s Dilemma devotes little consideration to the Samaritan’s motives. We assume 
that the Samaritan, by his very nature, wants to do good. While that may be the case on the scale 
of individual charity, states’ motivations are unlikely to be purely benevolent. Foreign policy is a 
mix of ideals and national interest. Powerful though the call to “make the world safe for 
democracy” is, international development policy is generally articulated in terms of national 
security and economic growth. The mission of the U.S. Trade & Development Agency, for 
example, is to “link U.S. businesses to export opportunities … while creating sustainable 
infrastructure and economic growth in partner countries.”7 The Bush administration defined U.S. 
National Security in terms of the three Ds: defense, diplomacy and development. 
We can safely assert that national and international donors are not strictly Samaritans in 
the biblical sense. Nonetheless, they do want to achieve their development goals – building a 
stable democracy, protecting human rights, improving education – even if their reasons for doing 
so are a mix of philanthropy and self-interest. 
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2.1 A BRIEF HISTORY OF DONOR ENGAGEMENT IN BIH: VISION AND GOALS 
Initially, the donor community’s vision for Bosnia as captured in the Dayton Peace 
Agreement had two core components: military and civilian. Firstly, the international community 
sought to prevent Bosnia from relapsing into conflict, a task for which NATO was deployed. The 
second task was more multifaceted: to build an independent, functional and democratic system of 
government in a territory that has previously been a republic in the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia. 
The Dayton Peace Agreement was signed in Paris on December 14, 1995. The NATO 
Implementation Force (IFOR) began its mission on December 20.8 IFOR was tasked with 
implementing the military aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement, in particular: 
o To ensure the end of hostilities, armies in the territory of BiH were to be disbanded and 
weapons were moved to controlled sites under IFOR supervision. 
o For the duration of its one-year mission, IFOR forces patrolled the de-militarized Inter-
Entity Boundary Line and inspected sites containing collected weapons. 
o IFOR’s activities also included the reconstruction of national infrastructure: the 
reopening of 2,500 km of roads, repair of 60 bridges and the reopening of Sarajevo 
airport. 
When IFOR’s mandate expired a year later, on December 20, 1996, it was succeeded by a 
NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR). The transition from IFOR to SFOR reflects the shift of donor 
attention towards BiH’s political environment. Although it retained responsibility for IFOR’s 
military aspects, SFOR was additionally tasked “to promote a climate in which the peace process 
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can continue to move forward [and] to provide selective support to civilian organisations within 
its capabilities.”9 
While IFOR/SFOR were tasked to implement the military aspects of the Dayton 
Agreement, the parties of Dayton also recognized that post-war BiH had a number of civilian 
aspects to consider, including “continuation of the humanitarian aid effort for as long as 
necessary; rehabilitation of infrastructure and economic reconstruction; the establishment of 
political and constitutional institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina; promotion of respect for 
human rights and the return of displaced persons and refugees; and the holding of free and fair 
elections.”10 To oversee the implementation of these civilian aspects, the Dayton Peace 
Agreement created the Office of the High Representative (OHR).11 OHR’s directive was 
somewhat broad: to “co-ordinate the activities of the civilian organisations and agencies in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina to ensure the efficient implementation of the civilian aspects of the 
peace settlement. The High Representative shall respect their autonomy within their spheres of 
operation while as necessary giving general guidance to them about the impact of their activities 
on the implementation of the peace settlement.”12 
In implementation, the OHR turned out to be an odd animal, a sort of modern day 
viceroy. Prior to the September 1997 elections, Bosnia was governed by a Joint Interim 
Commission chaired by the High Representative. Following the elections, OHR retained a very 
active role in the Bosnian government. In December 1997, the Peace Implementation Council 
authorized the High Representative to remove Bosnian officials from power and to enact laws 
when the elected legislature failed to take action.  
Annex 4 of the Dayton Peace Agreement articulates a vision for Bosnia as a multiparty 
representative democracy. Annex 4 prominently features the values of the Washington 
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consensus: promotion of a market economy, recognition of human rights and freedoms, and 
democratic governmental institutions. It established a system of governance that, while 
excessively complex in the effort to accommodate ethnic demands, laid the groundwork for a 
bicameral national legislature, rotating executive position, Constitutional Court and Central 
Bank. The Dayton Peace Agreement also embraced a system of political decentralization 
(admittedly, to a degree that would later cripple efforts at national reform), dividing the country 
into two ethnically based entities. Power is then further decentralized to the cantonal and 
municipal level.13  
The 2003 Thessaloniki Declaration14 laid open the door of EU membership to Bosnia, asserting 
firmly that “the future of the Balkans is within the European Union.”15 Through this public 
commitment to extend EU membership to BiH, the European Union reaffirmed its vision for 
Bosnia: a market-oriented democracy.  
2.2 DONOR STRATEGY 
We now turn our attention to the tools and methods that the international community 
employed in Bosnia to achieve the above stated objectives. In large part, the specific programs 
and approaches employed in Bosnia reflected the development/democratization philosophies of 
the day. These, in turn, had been influenced by the democratization processes in Latin America 
and were now deployed in the newly independent nations of the former USSR and Yugoslavia. 
The democracy promotion consensus hinged on two complementary strategies: creation 
of democratic institutions (free and fair elections, an independent judiciary, balance of powers 
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between branches, etc.) and the creation of a robust civil society that facilitates citizen 
participation. By the mid 1990s, this two-pronged strategy had established itself as the reigning 
theory of democracy promotion. 
Our primary interest concerns the second objective: donor-led efforts to cultivate civil 
society. Civil society is, in a sense, akin to U.S. Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart’s 
definition of pornography: I know it when I see it. We know it is important, yet we struggle to 
explain or define it. Elshtain describes civil society as the “a sphere of our communal life in 
which we answer together the most important questions: what is our purpose, what is the right 
way to act, and what is the common good. In short, it is the sphere of society that is concerned 
with moral formation and with ends, not simply administration or maximizing of the means.”16 
Robert Putnam, the man whose name is virtually synonymous with modern-day understanding of 
civil society, focuses on the participatory behaviors learned from associational life. Alternative 
definitions tend to mention some combination of the following: the voluntary nature of 
associations, provision of services, representation of citizen interests and social capital/trust. 
Government aid agencies have whole-heartedly embraced programmatic support for civil 
society. USAID, for example, the United States’ central agency for democracy and governance 
(DG) work, clustered their work around 4 pillars: rule of law, governance, civil society, and 
elections & political processes. In 1999, the agency focused around 40% of its DG spending on 
Central & Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union ($288 million of a total $635 million).17 
In 2013, in the effort to “replace a 20-year-old set of categories with a framework that describes 
what we are accomplishing, not what we are doing,”18 USAID released a new strategic 
framework. Of the four new Development Objectives (DOs), specified in Table 1, civil society is 
mentioned under three.19 On the topic of civil society, the 2013 Strategic Framework states: 
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“Citizen voice and civic expression are essential to building and sustaining democratic societies. 
Civil society organizations provide channels for citizen voice and can help citizens hold 
government accountable.”20  
 
Table 1 USAID Development Objectives 2013 Strategic Framework 
Development Objective Sub-objectives of greatest relevance to civil society promotion 
DO 1: “Promote 
participatory, representative 
and inclusive political 
processes and government 
institutions.” 
1.1: “Assist civil society and government partners to advance 
civil and political rights, including the freedoms of expression, 
association, peaceful assembly, and access to information” 
 
1.2: “Promote politically engaged and informed citizenries, 
active civil society organizations, organized labor, 
independent and open media, and representative political 
parties” 
DO 2: “Foster greater 
accountability of institutions 
and leaders to citizens and to 
the law.” 
2.2: “Support the ability of civil society and independent and 
open media to provide oversight and an informed critique of 
government” 
DO 3: “Protect and promote 
universally recognized 
human rights.” 
N/A 
DO 4: “Improve 
development outcomes 
through the integration of 
DRG principles and 
practices across USAID’s 
development portfolio.” 
4.1: “Strengthen country-based mechanisms for participation, 
inclusion, and local ownership across all USAID development 
sectors” 
 
4.2: “Encourage host governments and civil society to employ 
legitimate and effective accountability mechanisms” 
 
The centrality attributed to civil society is echoed by USAID’s international counterparts. 
The Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD) describes “a pluralistic, 
dynamic civil society as a complement to democratically elected institutions and a premise for 
democratic development.”21 One third of development cooperation funds at the Swedish Agency 
for International Development Cooperation (SIDA) are provided to civil society organizations 
(CSOs),22 which are described as “proposers of ideas, watchdogs of those in power and a 
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counterweight to and force for democratisation vis-à-vis the state.”23 The World Bank stresses 
consultation and engagement with CSOs such that, in 2011, 82% of Bank funded projects 
included CSO involvement.24 The Bank also provides financing to CSOs through funds such as 
the Development Marketplace25 and The Social Development Civil Society Fund.26 
Despite the importance placed on civil society by nearly every donor, it remains very 
broadly defined by the development community. UNDP notes that “over time, almost all donors 
have moved from a restrictive definition of civil society (initially equated with non-governmental 
organizations, or NGOs) toward a much more inclusive understanding of the term, encompassing 
other associational forms such as trade unions, faith-based groups, and community groups and 
wider objectives, including advocacy agendas.”27 UNDP goes on to note that CSOs serve one (or 
more) of several purposes: providing services, advocating for human/social rights or supporting 
social processes. 
Donors’ preference for specific aid modalities, in Bosnia and elsewhere, has evolved over 
time. In a 2004 New York Times op-ed, Javier Solana, the EU High Representative for Common 
Foreign and Security Policy, and Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, the NATO Secretary General, called for 
Bosnia to shift “out of the era of Dayton and into the era of Brussels.”28 Although the transition 
implied an increased local ownership, donors continue to use NGOs are a vehicle to advance 
their own objectives in BiH. Historically, the aid modalities employed in BiH have preferred 
formalized organizations as recipients. Leaderless, horizontal movements, while valid 
incarnations of public sentiment, simply do not align with donor engagement structures: who 
would sign the memorandum of understanding? In a fiercely competitive grant environment (the 
World Bank received 530 proposals for the 2010 round of The Development Marketplace for 
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Latin America and the Caribbean Region, of which only 14 were selected29), only CSOs with 
professional grant writing experience stand a realistic chance of receiving funding.  
Everywhere from Afghanistan to Kosovo, Western donors have embraced NGOs as the 
surefire path to participatory citizenship, both through funding of local NGOs and partnerships 
with international NGOs. To be sure, this relationship has not been free of criticism. This is aptly 
captured by Keith Brown in his description of the civil society syllogism: 
 
“Wider participation = civil society 
civil society = democracy 
democracy = the good.”30 
 
Brown goes on to note that such an oversimplification preserves a “neo-Tocquevillean 
world of civil society’s promise.”31  
Nonetheless, the promotion of civil society, in particular through the funding and training 
of local NGOs, was and remains a cornerstone to advancing donor objectives in post-war Bosnia. 
In Chapter 3, we examine in greater detail those NGOs in whom donors placed such great hopes. 
2.3 DONOR MOTIVATIONS 
Cold War era international aid had been, while not devoid of philanthropic intent, motivated 
explicitly by strategic and security concerns. Values were of lesser concern, as evidenced by U.S. 
support of dictatorships in Haiti, South Korea, the Philippines and elsewhere. The 1990s truly 
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were a new world order: the United States found itself, suddenly, the world’s undisputed 
superpower. Democracy had triumphed. It was an era of confidence in American values, as the 
third wave of democracy sweep across Latin America, Asia Pacific and the formerly communist 
countries of Europe. Europe, reunited, faced a new future, and the European Union took the 
preliminary steps in expanding its scope towards political union through the 1992 Maastricht 
Treaty. The humanitarian disasters of the decade – Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia – posed an 
opportunity to rethink aid outside the Cold War paradigm.  
Yet, the American approach to foreign intervention in the second half of the 1990s was 
also marked by caution. Following the death of 18 U.S. service members in Somalia, the Clinton 
administration became increasingly risk-averse. Reflecting on the future of humanitarian aid in 
1996, Foreign Affairs cited an April 1994 policy directive issued by President Clinton “that 
implied a sharp curtailment of American involvement in future armed humanitarian interventions 
and that marked a retreat from his administration's earlier rhetoric of assertive multilateralism.”32 
Arguably, this caution discouraged Western transatlantic leadership from taking a more 
active or earlier role in ending the war in Bosnia. Eventually, circumstances drew in a reluctant 
U.S. and, in the late winter of 1995, the international donor community faced the dual challenge 
of enforcing the peace and rebuilding a war-torn society. The most readily available source of 
insight into the motivations of the international community during this era comes from the words 
of international leaders themselves. The speeches and press statements from the period are 
heavily value laden, stressing a commitment to human rights, democracy, peace and unity. 
Speaking on the occasion of his approval for U.S. troop participation in SFOR, President Clinton 
noted that “by helping the Bosnian people build a peace that is self-sustaining, SFOR will also 
help advance our fundamental goal of building a Europe that is peaceful, undivided and 
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democratic.”33 Speaking in April 1996 at the Peace Implementation Council (PIC), then High 
Representative Caryl Bildt stressed:  
 
Our commitment to human rights and democracy is a commitment throughout the region 
… in political terms we must aim at an ‘entry strategy’ for Bosnia as well as for Croatia 
and Serbia into the structures and possibilities of European and international integration 
and co-operation. Every step towards human rights, democracy and economic reform is a 
step in this direction … integration is the key to peace and stability, but that integration 
must be based on a free society and a free economy.34 
 
Money followed such rhetoric in abundance. Official development aid (ODA) to Bosnia 
peaked in 1998 at 1.28 billion USD. In the first post-war years, the U.S. was consistently the 
largest single donor, contributing 216 million USD in 1998. Aid from EU institutions the same 
year totaled 133 million USD. Individual members of the Peace Implementation Council also 
gave generously: in 1998, Germany, Japan and the Netherlands each sent more than 40 million 
USD worth of aid to BiH.  
 Briefly, it is worth noting that while macro-level aid decisions are governed by 
strategic foreign policy priorities, the importance of individual decisions should not be 
discounted. National and agency leadership provide guidance, but even in the context of 
government bureaucracy, mid-level managers in a Western aid agency have a fair degree of 
latitude in deciding what projects to fund or programs to sponsor. In that sense, the mid-career 
USAID (SIDA, EU, etc.) bureaucrat assumes the role of small-scale Samaritan, acting on behalf 
of his government. Indeed, his decisions are more likely to be driven by the desire to do good, 
especially if he lives in the recipient country, interacting with the intended beneficiaries. 
In these immediate post-war years, the target areas of donor spending were guided by the 
so-called Priority Reconstruction and Recovery Program (PRRP). A joint product of the Bosnian 
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government, European Commission, World Bank and European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, the PRRP was designed to span three to four years and totaled a sum of 5.1 billion 
USD. In the three-year timeframe of 1996-1998, 4.2 billion USD was committed. Of that sum, 
58% was directed towards physical infrastructure, 18% to ‘Economic Re-start’ and 16% to 
‘Transition: Fiscal Support/Government Institution Building.’ A more detailed breakdown of 
component spending in each of these three sectors is provided in table 2 below.35 
 
Table 2 Priority Reconstruction and Recovery Program (PRRP) spending breakdown 
Sector 1996-1998 firm 
commitments, 
% share 
1. Physical Reconstruction 58% 
 Network Infrastructure  
  Transport 9% 
  Telecommunication 2% 
  Electric Power & Coal 12% 
 Community Revival  
  Water & Sanitation 5% 
  District Heat & Gas 2% 
  Housing 16% 
  Landmine Clearance 2% 
 Social Sectors  
  Health  5% 
  Education 5% 
2. Economic Restart 18% 
 Industry & Finance 10% 
 Agriculture 5% 
 Employment Generation 3% 
3. Transition: Fiscal Support/Government 
Institution Building 
16% 
 Fiscal/Government support 12% 
 Social Protection 4% 
 Transition TA 1% 
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As evidenced by sector spending, the donors’ predominant focus was on repairing the 
physical destruction of the war. The war had destroyed more than 2,000 km of main roads and 70 
bridges. Electric generating capacity had dropped by more than 50%, while coal production had 
fallen from 18 million tons to 1.5 million. 33% of housing in the Federation and 29% in the RS 
had been damaged. As such, the first years of reconstruction and donor aid concentrated on 
rebuilding the physical infrastructure that would serve as the foundation for national economic 
development. Concurrent with the institution building underway throughout the country (a less 
costly, but also less tangible task than that of building roads and bridges), donor spending in the 
second half of the 1990s can be characterized as targeting physical institutions and government 
institutions. 
With the dawn of the 21st century however, donor-giving patterns in BiH began to shift in 
several important ways. Most notable is the downward trend in aggregate aid, as seen in figure 1. 
As memories of the war faded further into the history books, Bosnia dropped on the global 
agenda, while the American War on Terror rocketed to the forefront. In 2001, ODA dropped to 
640 million USD. In the years since, it has hovered around 600 million USD annually. 
Figure 2, meanwhile, captures the variability present in donor aid by comparing the 
amount of aid received in a given year with that received the previous year. Beginning in 2000, 
ten of the past fourteen years display a negative percent change, indicating the BiH received less 
ODA than in the previous year. While the year-to-year data shows some variability (the floods of 
2014, though not capture in the data here, will likely produce a spike in aid), the overall trend 
points to a gradual and ongoing reduction of ODA. 
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 Figure 1 Official Development Aid (ODA) to BiH 
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 Figure 2 Year to Year Flucuation in ODA to BiH 
 
Figures 3 and 4 (below) divide donor spending by sector. While the categorizations36 are 
a bit broader than we would like, we can still discern shifting donor priorities. Transportation and 
Communication, which received large amounts of donor money in the immediate post-war years, 
received only 10 million USD in 2005 and less than 1 million in 2013. Likewise, water supply 
and sanitation received 10 million USD of ODA in 2005 and $14 million in 2013, significantly 
down from the $213 million spent between 1996 and 1998. Beginning in 2006, humanitarian aid 
dropped to negligible amounts.  
Intuitively, this makes sense. In the immediate years following the war, the country was 
physically devastated and the embryonic government lacked the capacities or resources to 
provide basic public services. The international donors stepped in to fill the gap. As government 
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capacity grew and reconstruction goals were met, donor priorities naturally evolved. Moving into 
the 21st century, donors turned their attention (and their money) to education, promotion of free 
media, judicial independence, etc. 
 
 
Figure 3 2005 ODA by Sector 
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 Figure 4 2013 ODA by Sector 
 
Finally, the post-2000 data on ODA shows a clear trend away from the United States as 
the primary donor and towards the EU as the top donor. By 2012, EU institutions supplied a full 
55% of total ODA, surpassing the United States’ all time high in 1998. The same year, the U.S. 
supplied only $38 million USD, roughly 7% of total ODA. Although the United States and 
European Union have presented themselves as allies in Bosnian reconstruction, there are 
nonetheless variances in their tactics, objectives and processes. In particular, the EU views 
assistance to Bosnia through the lens of the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA). The 
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EU’s Multi-Annual Indicative Planning Document (MIPD) for 2007-09 articulates the EU’s 
objective in BiH as follows: “to help Bosnia and Herzegovina to face the challenges of European 
integration, to implement the reforms needed to fulfill EU requirements and progress in the 
Stabilisation and Association Process and to lay the foundations for fulfilling the Copenhagen 
criteria for EU membership.”37 This transatlantic reversal, as such, has relevance for the 
dominant donor agenda in BiH. 
 
 
Figure 5 US & EU Aid to BiH, 1995-2012 
7 U.S. Trade and Development Agency, “About USTDA.” http://www.ustda.gov/about/ Accessed March 7 2015, 8 Stabilization Force. “History of the NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” http://www.nato.int/sfor/docu/d981116a.htm Access December 17 2014. 9 Ibid. 
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10 The General Framework Agreement: Annex 10 Agreement on Civilian Implementation. http://www.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp?content_id=366 Accessed December 17 2014. 11 Office of the High Representative. “The Mandate of the OHR,” http://www.ohr.int/ohr-info/gen-info/default.asp?content_id=38612 Accessed December 17 2014.  12 Ibid. 13 Only the Federation, not the RS, includes cantons. 14 Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro – all potential candidate countries as of 2003 – were all party to the Thessaloniki Declaration. 15 EU-Western Balkans Summit. Thessaloniki 21 June 2003. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PRES-03-163_en.htm   16 Elshtain, Jean Bethke. 1999. A Call to Civil Society. Society 36(5): 11-19.  17 Carothers, Thomas. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Revitalizing U.S. Democracy Assistance The Challenge of USAID, 2009. http://carnegieendowment.org/files/revitalizing_democracy_assistance.pdf  18 USAID Strategy on Democracy Human Rights and Governance. USAID Bureau of Policy, Planning and Learning. http://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2496/DRG%20Strategy%202%20pager_7-25-13.pdf  19 USAID Strategy on Democracy Human Rights and Governance. June 2013. http://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/USAID%20DRG_%20final%20final%206-24%203%20(1).pdf  20 Ibid. 21 Principles for Norad’s Support to Civil Society in the South. Norwegian Agency for 
Development Cooperation, May 2009. 22 Donor’s Civil Society Strategies and Partnership Modalities A Resource Guide. United Nations Development Programme. March 2012. http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/documents/partners/civil_society/publications/2012_UNDP_Donor-Civil-Society-Strategies-and-Partnerships-Modalities_EN.pdf  23 Pluralism: Policy for Support to Civil Society in Developing Countries Within Swedish Development Cooperation. MFA Information Services and the Department for Development Policy. 2009. http://www.government.se/content/1/c6/13/13/60/8c589318.pdf   24 Donor’s Civil Society Strategies and Partnership Modalities A Resource Guide. United Nations Development Programme. March 2012. http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/documents/partners/civil_society/publications/2012_UNDP_Donor-Civil-Society-Strategies-and-Partnerships-Modalities_EN.pdf  25 The Development Marketplace is described as “a competitive grant program that identifies and funds innovative, early stage development projects that are scalable and/or replicable, while also having high potential for development impact.” Since 1998, it has provided $60 million in grants to 1,200 projects. 
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26 The CSF was created in 1983 and operated until 2012. During the time, it directly funded CSOs in more than 50 countries. In 2012, its portfolio was incorporated into the Bank’s new Global Partnership for Social Accountability 27 Donor’s Civil Society Strategies and Partnership Modalities A Resource Guide. United Nations Development Programme. March 2012. http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/documents/partners/civil_society/publications/2012_UNDP_Donor-Civil-Society-Strategies-and-Partnerships-Modalities_EN.pdf  28 Solana, Javier & Jaap de Hoop Scheffer “Guiding Bosnia along the road to Brussels, ”The 
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3.0  THE NGO PERSPECTIVE: THE MIXING OF MONEY AND MISSION 
With an improved understanding of the donor’s motivations, vision and strategy, we now turn 
our attention to the recipients of donor monies: the NGOs. Our interest revolves around NGO 
behavior, in particular how they may have reactively changed their behavior in light of donor 
funding. As noted earlier, NGOs will not openly admit if they changed their behavior in response 
to the presence of donor money. They may not even realize they have done so. As such, we focus 
on the process of mission evolution as a proxy, proceeding under the assumption that mission 
evolution is characteristic of an organization responsive to the changing needs of its 
constituencies.  
Both for-profit and not-for-profit organizations have missions. However, the core goal of 
for-profit organizations is to make money; the mission placed on corporate letterhead simply 
elaborates on how they will meet that goal. That is not to say that moral values and standards 
found in corporate mission statements are insincere; companies pursue their missions in the 
belief that doing so will generate profit. Proctor & Gamble’s mission statement captures the 
‘win-win’ attitude towards mission and profit: “We will provide branded products and services 
of superior quality and value that improve the lives of the world’s consumers. As a result, 
consumers will reward us with leadership sales, profit, and value creation, allowing our people, 
our shareholders, and the communities in which we live and work to prosper.”38 
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As non-profits are not in the business of making money, the mission assumes singular 
centrality in the organization’s behavior and identity. The mission is, as McDonalds describes it, 
the raison d’être of the organization.39 Money is a necessary means of achieving the mission, but 
profit is not pursued for its own sake. 
The literature provides ample discussion, if not consensus, on the process of non-profit 
mission formulation and evolution. Mission formulation occurs in the early stages of an 
organization and captures the personal passions and life experiences of the founders. Put another 
way, organizations “come into being and exit primarily to give expression to the social, 
philosophical, moral or religious values of their founders and supporters.”40 Bart and Tabone 
note three core functions of the mission statement: to guide and focus decision making, to 
motivate and inspire employees and to create balance between interests of different 
stakeholders.41 As seen in the sample presented below, the mission statement articulates the 
organization’s target beneficiaries, the core problem it wants to address and the impact it wants 
to achieve.  
o United Way improves lives by mobilizing the caring power of communities around the 
world to advance the common good.42 
o The American Red Cross prevents and alleviates human suffering in the face of 
emergencies by mobilizing the power of volunteers and the generosity of donors.43 
o Lydia’s Place mission is dedicated to helping female offenders and their dependent 
children rebuild their lives and to become productive members of the community.44 
o Big Brother, Big Sister providesf children facing adversity with strong and enduring, 
professionally supported one-to-one relationships that change their lives for the better, 
forever.45 
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Missions, however, are not set in stone. A case study of the San Francisco-based Career 
Action Center identifies a number of external events that may prompt a shift in mission: changes 
in one’s client base, the entrance of new donors, direct requests from clients, a growth in 
available funds or a need for revenue. Schmid furthers this list, noting that changes in an 
organization’s identify may occur as a result of 1) changes in the task environment, 2) internal 
pressures (from staff and/or volunteers) and 3) expectations imposed by agents or constituents.46 
Much of the literature on mission evolution focuses specifically on the phenomena of mission 
drift: abandoning one’s original mission to please or entice donors and stakeholders. An especial 
concern is how different sources of funding can induce mission drift. In an analysis of resource 
dependence, Froelich evaluates the pressures associated with private contributions, government 
and foundation funds and commercial activities. She finds mission drift (or goal displacement) to 
be more likely in instances of private contribution or foundation grants, with the latter able to 
exert pressure on NGO activities simply by setting thematic funding priorities. Interestingly, she 
finds government funding to be associated with lesser risk of mission drift, although it comes at 
the expense of bureaucratization: more time spent on documentation, compliance and 
government processes. Lastly, Froelich finds that revenue from commercial services is the most 
flexible of possible non-profit revenue sources, although questions remain as to how engagement 
in commercial activity might damage the non-profit’s legitimacy.47 Despite the negative 
connotations of mission drift, however, mission evolution can have good results and ensure the 
continued relevance of an organization, if it is undertaken strategically and intentionally.  
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3.1 NGO FORMATION AND MISSION EVOLUTION IN POST-WAR 
HERZEGOVINA 
If mission formulation captures the values, life experiences and beliefs of founders, Bosnian 
NGOs formed in the years following the war had no shortage of problems from which to choose. 
The war had created some 1.2 million refugees. A year and half after the cessation of hostilities, 
750,000 refugees were living within BiH, while thousands resided temporarily in Germany, 
Croatia and Serbia.48 Dayton demobilized 425,000 soldiers, creating a class of veterans carrying 
the physical and mental scars of war.49 As of 1999, there were an estimated 30,000 minefields in 
the country, affecting a monthly average of 49 victims in 1996.50 Economic damage associated 
with the war was estimated by the World Bank to value between 15 and 20 billion USD, with a 
full one third of housing destroyed.51 
Yet, we would be idealistic to assume that the motivations of all newly minted NGO 
leaders were 100 percent pure. Unemployment in the post-war years was enormous. People 
needed jobs and livelihoods. Old companies (if they had survived) likely were not hiring, but 
there was a huge influx of foreign aid: $869,130,000 in 1997, $934,830,000 in 1998 and an all-
time high of $1,403,810,000 in 1999. In the context of the post-war economy, any enterprising 
individual will go to where the money is: in this case, the NGO sector. Sterland writes that the 
“high NGO registration also reflected a high degree of opportunism from those seeking an 
income rather than a vehicle to pursue a social mission.”52 This concern has been echoed by 
others in the NGO community: a 2004 independent assessment of Bosnian civil society, based 
upon interviews and focus groups with government officials, journalists, donors and domestic 
NGOs noted that “most stakeholders viewed the high number of inactive NGOs and those ‘more 
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interested in money than mission’ as adversely affecting the image of the sector and, in the case 
of the later, diluting precious resources.”53 This was repeated in one of our NGO interviews, 
wherein the interviewee recalled an anecdote wherein a cohort of NGOs had refused to share 
data for advocacy purposes. The interviewee speculated that a spirit of self-preservation was at 
work – to ensure their continued funding and relevance, the organizations concerned treated the 
data as proprietary. In this particular case, the use of data as a bargaining chip turned the NGOs 
into an obstacle, rather than a vehicle, for progress.54  
We do not want to give the impression that all NGO leaders were in it for personal gain, 
nor that their aims were purely altruistic. The truth of the matter likely lies somewhere in the 
middle, with variation between organizations. What is apparent is that all NGOs and donors 
operate in an arena with perverse incentives: an individual’s economic need to secure a source of 
income coexists uncomfortably with his desire to bring positive change. NGO staff have, at a 
minimum, two priorities: to advance their organizational mission on the basis on personal 
conviction and to ensure organizational longevity (and, thereby, job security). Faced with these 
incentive structures, NGO founders, leaders and staff will respond accordingly. To summarize a 
disclaimer issued by Cooley and Ron in their study of international NGOs, we ought not make 
accusations of immorality when the problems are institutionally conditioned.55 
3.2 BOSNIA’S 99 PERCENT (OF NGOS) 
Before we proceed in our discussion of the NGO community in BiH, several distinctions are 
necessary. As noted earlier, the Bosnian non-profit ‘market’ is awash in NGOs. The first 
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distinction of note is between the active and inactive NGOs. The Bosnian system for NGO 
registration operates on a one-time basis – NGOs never reregister. As such, the registries are 
certain to include many paper NGOs – organizations that are now defunct. Additionally, the 
decentralization of the NGO registration process (organizations may choose to register at the 
national, entity, cantonal or municipal level) creates the possibility of double counting 
organizations.  
It is difficult to know what percent of the 12,000 plus registered NGOs are active. The 
EU Special Representative places the number between 500 and 1500.56 A 2009 study of civil 
society in BiH, funded by the European Union and jointly conducted by Kronauer Consulting 
and HTSPE, attempted to establish contact with a representative sample of registered NGOs. The 
researchers successfully established contact with 536 of the 988 sample registered NGOs they 
contacted, from which they estimated that 6620 organizations were active nationwide.57 
The second division of importance is the distinction between what we will term ‘elite’ 
and ‘marginal’ NGOs. Whatever the number of active organizations, only a small fraction of 
NGOs fall into the elite category. These NGOs receive the vast majority of available foreign 
funding and hence conduct the majority of programs. This elite status is self-perpetuating: grant 
writing skills and an insider’s understanding of donor objectives ensure continued access to 
funds.  
On the other hand (or, outside the international donor gravy train) is a much larger group 
of NGOs. These marginal NGOs generally lack resources and capacities and are very limited in 
geographic scope. The above-cited Kronauer Consulting/HTSPE research found that 75.8% of 
surveyed NGOs had no donor strategy. As such, it is not surprising, that 60.45% of NGOs did 
not secure funds for 2009. A full 53.7% had no formal employees and relied exclusively on 
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volunteers, significantly impairing organizational capacity.58 For NGOs stuck in the marginal 
category, a lack of funding, staff and donor know-how creates a catch 22: you cannot gain access 
to donor funds without knowledgeable staff, but you cannot hire staff without funding.  
Given that our interest revolves around the interaction of donor presence and NGO 
behavior, our focus will remain on the elite NGOs, as they have regular and direct interaction 
with the donors. We will return to the fate and potential of the marginal NGOs in the final 
chapter. 
3.3 METHODOLOGY 
The core data was drawn from six interviews conducted with the following local NGOs: Centar 
za istrazivacko novinarstvo (Center for Investigative Reporting), Centar za okolišno održivi 
razvoj (Centre for Environmentally Sustainable Development), Centar za životnu sredinu (Center 
for the Environment), Centar za postkonfliktna istraživanja (Post-Conflict Research Center), 
PRONI Centar za omlaldinski razvoj Brčko (PRONI Center for Youth Development in Brčko), 
and Youth Initiative for Human Rights Sarajevo (YIHR). This sample of NGOs, while small in 
number, provides geographic diversity (covering Sarajevo, Banja Luka and Brčko), as well as 
thematic variety (environmental protection, post-conflict reconciliation, economic development 
and government transparency). Details concerning the interviewed NGOs are summarized in 
table 3. 
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 Table 3 Interviewed NGOs 
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The above NGOs were identified via personal contact of the researcher and via online 
research of donor-funded projects. The interviewees were self-selecting in that they responded to 
email requests to participate in an interview. In that sense, we should acknowledge the presence 
of section bias: the interviewed NGOs are all part of the ‘elite’ category (an intentional criteria, 
as those are the NGO that interact with donors). Additionally, in agreeing to be interviewed, we 
ascertain that these NGOs were confident enough in the quality of their portfolio to publicize 
their work. Interviews were conducted via Skype, in English, in February 2015. The analysis is 
supplemented by the author’s firsthand experience in Bosnia from September 2013 – July 2014, 
which included time as a volunteer at the Post-Conflict Research Center (one of the 
interviewees) and as an intern at the UNDP Country Office, the latter of which provided indirect 
exposure to donor activities.  
Secondarily, we look at projects funded by the U.S. Congressionally-funded National 
Endowment for Democracy (NED) to gauge shifts in relative importance attributed to NGOs to 
various sectors. Our sample consists of projects funded in four years, strategically chosen to 
represent changes in 1) donors’ treatment of Bosnia and 2) domestic need. 
 
o 1996: This marks the first full post-conflict year in which all donor priorities were 
governed by the Priority Reconstruction and Recovery Program. Immediate needs 
included service provision to refugees and wartime victims, demining, right of return, 
etc. International NGOs predominated during this time. 
o 2002: Seven years following the end of the conflict, needs would have evolved to 
include anti-corruption measures, programs to strengthen the judiciary system, job 
creation, etc. Meanwhile, the terrorist attacks of 9-11 drove a shift in U.S., and 
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perhaps to a lesser degree European, development priorities, with increased spending 
on security cooperation.  
o 2008: In 2006, the Peace Implementation Council noted that “the time for transition 
from the OHR [Office of the High Representative] to an EUSR Office is 
approaching.” In February 2008, the PIC followed up with the 5+2 agenda, the 
conditions that must be met for the Office of the High Representative to closes its 
doors. Although the conditions of 5+2 have yet to be met, OHR has increasingly 
passed the mantle of international leadership to the EU Special Representative since 
2006. With that shift comes a shift in donor priorities, with a heavy focus on the 
reforms necessary to acquire EU candidate status (with the eventual, if distant, goal of 
EU membership). Donor aid priorities in this period would be geared towards the 
Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA), which includes three priority areas 
for all potential candidate countries: political requirements, socio-economic 
requirements and European standards. 
o 2012: Owing to a lag in data availability, 2012 will serve to capture current NGO 
sector activities. By 2012, donor fatigue and withdrawal was well underway: in 2011, 
Spain, the UK and the Netherlands closed their aid operations in BiH.  
This four-year sample of NED funded projects captures 58 projects. Accounting for 
repeat organizations (several organization received multiple NED grants), this represents 42 
different grant recipients. Per NED’s specification, all recipients are “nongovernmental 
organizations, which may include civic organizations, associations, independent media, and other 
similar organizations.”59 The chosen sample is prone to several potential sources of error. In 
particular, recipients include both international and local NGOs. International NGOs are more 
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prominent in the 1996 list of recipients and shift largely to local NGOs in the following years. 
Additionally, as the sample only includes projects selected by NED to receive a grant, there 
exists an element of donor selection. It would be worthwhile to consider a list of all projects that 
applied to NED in a given year; unfortunately, such data is not publically availably (furthermore, 
it would complicate matters in that many of the applicant projects were never 
funded/implemented). There is also a strong likelihood that grant applicants/recipients design 
projects to match donor priorities, thereby increasing their chance of receiving a grant. This risk 
is somewhat mitigated by NED’s relatively broad, non-country specific priorities.60 Nonetheless, 
grant applicants/recipients may well have been noted what projects previously received funding 
and geared their proposal accordingly (isomorphism).  
NED’s annual reports include lists of organizations funded, the grant amount and a short 
description of the project’s purpose and intended outputs/outcomes. Using the project 
descriptions, I classify each project by sector, allowing for multiple classifications where 
appropriate. For example, if a project concerns youth education around elections, the project 
would be classified as both ‘Education/youth’ and ‘Electoral democracy.’ The sector categories 
were identified based on themes observed in the projects themselves. 
Acting on the assumption that the number of projects conducted in a sector is an indicator 
of the importance the NGO community attaches to said sector, I rank order the sectors to indicate 
reflective importance.  
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3.4 FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
In conversations with NGO leaders, organizational mission proved a challenging concept to nail 
down. We have identified three general models for mission evolution that encompass the extent 
and cause of change.  In brief, the models are: 1) organizations whose present mission closely 
mirrors their original missions, 2) organizations that consciously adapted their mission to align 
with donor priorities and funding criteria and 3) organizations whose founding mission was so 
broad and all encompassing that one cannot identify mission drift or fulfillment. 
3.4.1 STAYING THE COURSE 
Articulating a clearly defined and specific focus at an organization’s founding is critical to 
mission success. It enables the NGO to focus its limited resources and thereby maximize impact. 
Possession of a well-defined mission at the start also increases the likelihood that an organization 
will stay the course, adhering to the same mission over the course of its organizational lifetime. 
This model was observed with both the Center for Investigative Reporting (CIN) and Centre for 
Environmentally Sustainable Development (COOR). CIN’s initial mission remains unchanged: 
to educate citizens through the use of investigative journalism. The organization’s capacity to 
achieve said mission has expanded as staff gained experience and expertise. As a consequence, 
the volume and depth of topics CIN covers have grown, such that its extensive online coverage 
now includes spending by political parties, government salaries and government issued pardons. 
In the case of COOR, the interviewee noted that the initial mission, to reestablish connections 
between Bosnian citizens using environmental issues as a framework, was unchanged. In 
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discussing the process used to evaluate potential projects with partner organizations, the 
interviewee specifically noted that they would proceed “if an initiative is in line with our 
mission.”61 Such a comment is indicative of using mission as a filter, a tactic that Dolnicar et al. 
identify as a critical safeguard against mission creep.62 COOR has also displayed the capacity to 
consciously and intentionally adapt its tactics to changing circumstances. This is on display in 
the organization’s changing relationship with the government: in the late 1990s, COOR worked 
as a partner to government, collecting and sharing information about environmental protection. 
As the government grew in capacity, COOR increasingly assumed an advocacy role towards the 
government. Such tactical adaptability ensures continued relevance. 
Notably, both COOR and CIN appear relatively secure in their relationship with donors. 
CIN stated that they rely on 10-15 international donors and expressed confidence that donor 
money would continue to be an important source of revenue in the future. The 
professionalization of the organization (20 fulltime staff) speaks to a fairly reliable cash flow.63 
Undoubtedly, this was aided by the organization’s beginnings as a USAID project. Although 
CIN registered as a local organization in 2005, its USAID roots no doubt provided entry to the 
donor cohort. 
COOR’s financial resources are far less than those of CIN, as evidenced by the fact that 
all staff participates on a voluntary basis. However, in the course of the interview and when 
asked about challenges facing the organization, the interviewee made no mention of insufficient 
financial resources, a common complaint amongst the NGO community. 
The ‘staying the course’ model relies upon continued access to donor funds. Absent that, 
the organization would be forced to shift its own priorities to match donor priorities (discussed 
below in the Reluctant Evolution model). We are, however, reluctant to speculate that continued 
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access to donor funds has permitted to COOR and CIN to metaphorically rest on their laurels. To 
the contrary, need surrounding their initial (and continued) missions remains high. CIN has 
increased its internal capacity and COOR demonstrates responsiveness to external events, 
adjusting its tactics accordingly. Both of these behaviors are indicative of high effort. Further, 
CIN has been proactive in exploring commercial revenue sources that would diversify their 
funding base. 
3.4.2 RELUCTANT EVOLUTION 
In the developed and developing world alike, there exists a fear that donors will coop NGOs, 
forcing them to abandon their original mission in favor of donor priorities. Faced with a 
mismatch of NGO/donor priorities, AbouAssi outlines four options available to the NGO, 
drawing on an amended version of Hirschman’s typology: exit, voice, loyalty or adjustment.64 
We found some evidence of this donor-driven pressure in BiH, although the viability of the ‘exit’ 
option is questionable, given sector-wide reliance on foreign donor monies.  
PRONI Centar za omladinski razvoj Brčko was founded in 1998 with close cooperation 
of a Swedish University to conduct conflict mitigation programs with young people. Employing 
a methodology developed in post-conflict Northern Ireland, the curriculum brought together 
Bosniak, Serbian and Croatian youth for a dialogue intended to achieve reconciliation and build 
peace.  
PRONI readily acknowledged that its mission has migrated towards community 
engagement, youth entrepreneurship and employment in recent years, attributing the shift to 
declining donor interest in democratization, as well as shifting interests amongst its target 
42 
 
population. This appears a textbook case of donor-driven mission shift, albeit a case in which 
donor pressure moved the NGO into a high-need area. The interviewee acknowledged the 
relevance of economic needs, but also stressed the continued, unmet need for peace building and 
reconciliation.65  
PRONI’s experience offers us several insights.  First, donor driven mission drift can 
simultaneously divert an NGO from its original mission and guide it towards an in-demand 
sector. Community needs are met, with the donor acting as manager and the NGOs serving as 
staff. However, this hierarchy forfeits the on-the-ground insights into community need that a 
strong grassroots NGO can provide and forces the NGO into unfamiliar waters. The interviewee 
at PRONI commented: “I was invited into Swedish Embassy where we were planning because 
they took us as stakeholders … we all said young people, peace building, gender, equality, 
human rights are important for this country. But when they developed their strategic plan they 
completely kicked out that kind of democratization. I don’t know, it’s not up to us.” 
In stressing the importance of continued support for peace building to the Swedish 
donors, PRONI was executing its voice option. When that failed, PRONI exercised adjustment, a 
conscious decision to shift its priorities to align with donors. Such a path is not without risks: 
losing touch with one’s mission, the upward movement of accountability and undermining one’s 
credibility with the public. While PRONI appears to have skirted these dangers, maintaining a 
high degree of community connection, the fact remains that donor priorities trump those of local 
players in the Reluctant Evolution model. 
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3.4.3 THE CATCHALL MISSION 
Whereas the aforementioned NGOs possessed a clearly articulated mission upon founding, said 
focus is not universal across the NGO sector. In other cases, the mission is excessively broad and 
all encompassing. In such cases, it is difficult to identify mission drift or, alternatively, mission 
fulfillment. This was most apparent in the case of the Post Conflict Research Center (P-CRC). P-
CRC has conducted a range of diverse projects, all in the general field of peace building and 
reconciliation, but, to use the language of the donors, the aggregate theory of change is notable 
absent. Projects appear to be selected on an ad hoc basis. Each stands separately and does not 
build upon the goals and gains of prior projects.  
The catchall mission might arise from one of several causes. It could be that the founders 
never narrowed down their vision, attempting to fit all their diverse passions into a single 
organization. Alternatively, an NGO may intentionally craft a mission broad enough that it can 
be stretched to encompass whatever priority of the day the donor has articulated. Whatever the 
driver, the dangers are the same: a grab bag of projects that require that staff to habitually build 
new skills and networks. An NGO with the Catchall Mission faces the metaphorical challenge of 
an inch deep, a mile wide. 
Notably, P-CRC voiced heavy complaints about resource availability, noting the presence 
of “nepotism and corruption” in access to international funding. The interviewee placed blame 
with local embassy staff who were “in a position to influence how funding will be delivered,” as 
well as an exclusive club of donor-favored NGOs who control access to the donors. One’s access 
to funding, she stated, depended more on “connections” than organizational capacities or the 
virtues of a project. In spite of these complaints, donors listed on P-CRC’s website include a 
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range of well-known governmental and private donors: U.S. Embassy, United Nations, NATO, 
Norwegian Embassy, Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, Open Society Institute 
and the BMW Group. 
It is hard to reconcile these various sentiments and behaviors. In an environment 
characterized by shifting donor priorities, a Catchall Mission NGO may actually be more likely 
to survive than an NGO with a singularity of focus, given its ability to remake itself according to 
donor demands. As a result, however, it is subject to an intensified version of the risks identified 
in the Reluctant Evolution model: upward accountability and low credibility with the public. 
Although the Catchall Mission NGO may be an effective implementer of donor-funded projects, 
its capacity to serve as a vehicle for civil society is questionable.  
In a 1996 article, Ian Smillie warned against the donor habit of treating NGOs as service 
delivery agents in BiH. Following up in 2001, Smillie and Kristie Evenson observed that 
“channeling money through local organizations, [donors] could implement discrete projects with 
set goals. They could get a lot done with a little money. But this worked against the creation of 
an environment for long-term civil society sustainability.”66 Donor strategies have shifted since 
2001 to address this concern. The 2005 Paris Declaration, in particular, identified priorities by 
which to increase aid effectiveness. Bilateral and multilateral donor alike have made recent 
efforts to provide core funding to replace the ‘project treadmill.’67 However, as the example of 
P-CRC suggests, complicit NGOs can permit the endurance of the ‘NGO as service delivery 
agent’ model. NGOs with broadly defined missions are especially prone to, and arguably even 
financially benefit from, the project treadmill. This sort of constant mission shifting is not 
evidence of responsiveness to public needs; rather, it likely indicates an NGO out of touch with 
community need. 
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3.5 SAMARITAN’S DILEMMA AT WORK? 
Armed with these insights, we return to our central question: did the guarantee of donor funding 
incentivize recipients to alter their behavior, specifically towards exerting less effort? 
Mission evolution occurred to varying degrees across the six NGOs with whom we 
conducted interviews. Where mission shift did occur, it was conscious, but reluctant. We did not 
find evidence of the intentional and independent decision making that would point to 
responsiveness to changing constituent needs. 
On the other hand, we have those organizations whose mission has remained largely 
unchanged. Our previous hypothesis rested on the assumption that failure to evolve one’s 
mission was evidence of unresponsiveness to changing social needs. Upon seeing NGO mission 
in practice however, this assumption requires revision. Steadfastness in mission may, in fact, 
indicate deep and continued need. The COOR interviewee stated that the government has made 
negative progress in the quality of environmental reviews. The CIN interviewee stated that “the 
[media] situation is not much better now that it was in 2004,” specifically stressing the obstacles 
that journalists face in gaining access to supposedly public information. The problems these 
NGOs confront lack quick fixes. Bolstered by either donors who are consistent in their support or 
by the capacity resist donor pressure, NGOs double down on their original mission.  
Our limited qualitative survey suggests that, while the Samaritan’s Dilemma may take 
hold on a case by case basis, it is not sufficiently widespread to singlehandedly explain the 
observed disconnect between Bosnian NGOs and the public. For that, alternative, and perhaps 
complementary, explanations are needed. We turn briefly to a trend that emerged repeatedly in 
conversations with interviewees: the mystery of the missing constituency. 
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3.6 LEADERS WITHOUT FOLLOWERS 
In her article on the impact of foreign donors on civil society organizations in Russia, Sarah 
Henderson notes that she had the impression she was meeting “leaders without followers.” “Few 
groups,” she writes, “had volunteers and even fewer had a clear concept of a core group of 
people that they claimed to represent.”68 
The interviews conducted with Bosnian NGOs yielded a similar impression, with one 
notable exception. When asked to identify their target beneficiaries, responses were very broad, 
including ‘Bosnian citizens’ and ‘youth.’ In conversations about the organizations’ strategic 
planning processes and priority setting, there were no mechanisms by which to engage a public 
constituency. These two observations are logically linked: when one’s target beneficiaries are all 
Bosnian citizens, the prospect of establishing a meaningful two-way dialogue is near impossible. 
The extreme of this phenomenon is the NGO where a local constituency is not only 
absent, but considered unnecessary. The P-CRC interviewee described her vision for the 
organization as an “organization of young experts from all around the world … bringing change 
in society.” The key difference here is not in the end result (change in society, a clean 
environment, political transparency) but in the process. A corporation or a government is 
equally, if not more, capable of achieving those results. An NGO is distinct in that it achieves 
that change not only for society but with society. The entire process – from identifying the needs 
to implementing change – should be cooperative and inclusive.  
All the interviewed organizations were providing praiseworthy services and displayed 
strong personal conviction in their work. Their projects aspired to protect national parks, 
exposure corruption and increase awareness of the handling electronic waste. However, it 
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appears that their projects were selected and designed by a small group of NGO employees, with 
minimal to no public consultation to gauge their needs.  
The conduct of projects of social, political and economic value to BiH is a positive trend. 
However, the unique value of NGOs lays in their capacity to act as a conduit for and give voice 
to the public’s needs. If NGOs lack mechanisms to engage in dialogue with beneficiaries, their 
project selection, design and rationale lies on the assumptions of organizational leadership. The 
result, then, is a small number of individuals deciding what is best for society as a whole. The 
NGO, in other words, knows best. 
Given the reoccurrence of this missing constituency in our interviews, we propose that 
this is a likely (if not exclusive) explanation for the observed NGO/society disconnect. The 
public does not necessarily reject the work of NGOs, they simply do not feel represented by 
those NGOs. The federal, entity, and municipal governments each pay lip service to acting in the 
citizens’ best interest. The foreign donors, World Bank and UN offer white papers and funds to 
move Bosnia forward. In the country’s 2014 national elections, 65 registered political parties, 
most of ethnic affiliations, claimed to represent the interest of Croats, Serbs or Bosniaks.69 
Bosnians are not short on actors claiming to act on their behalf. NGOs devoid of a constituency 
are just another such actor. 
Notably, the PRONI Centar za omladinski razvoj Brčko stands out in contrast to this 
trend. PRONI played a central role in creating the Youth Club network, a network of 26 clubs in 
the Brčko region. PRONI’s volunteer base includes 2 volunteers from each club, individuals who 
manifest the network linkages. In the past, PRONI had daily and weekly interaction with the 
clubs via program support, joint activities and provision of monitoring and evaluation expertise. 
In the past two to three years, however, the interviewee noted that PRONI’s ties with the network 
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have weakened. He admitted that current “connections and relations to the local society is 
questionable” and identified reengaging the network as one of PRONI’s top priorities. Despite 
the recent lapse, the Youth Club Network appears a standout, if exceptional, instance of 
grassroots dialogue, providing the NGO with a direct, two-way conduit to their beneficiaries. 
The mystery of the missing constituency is a fruitful area for future research. In 
particular, research should explore the role of donor money and accompanying upward 
accountability in diminishing NGOs’ traditional downward accountability. Donor civil society 
strategy worldwide has moved towards encouraging networks between NGOs. These initial 
findings suggest, however, that in BiH, equal attention should be given to fostering networks that 
connect NGOs with the community. Future research also ought to examine existing networks, 
such as the Youth Center network, that link NGOs to constituents in more detail in order to 
evaluate their potential as models.  
3.7 NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY FUNDED PROJECTS 
Before considering the policy implications of these finding, we will briefly examine changes in 
NGO focus via the sample of NED funded NGO projects. First, we should note the varying 
volume of resources directed to Bosnia over the selected four-year period. As seen in Table 4, 
both the total amount of funding available to BiH and the number of recipient organizations 
increased threefold over the sample time period. International NGOs account for half (4 of 8) of 
the recipients in 1996. In the following three years, local NGO predominate. Given the smaller 
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sample size in 1996 and 2002, there is significantly less variation in the sector rankings than in 
the later years. 
 
Table 4 NED Grants to BiH, Statistics 
 1996 2002 2008 2012 
Total amount 
distributed 
$548,746 
 
$443,088 
 
$908,015 
 
$1,525,160 
 
Average grant 
amount 
$68,593 
 
$55,386 
 
$36,28770 
 
$40,747 
 
Number of 
grants 
distributed 
8 8 15 28 
 
The rankings for sectors in which projects were funded are presented in Tables 5 – 8. 
Several trends are immediately apparently. First, the category of 
‘Media/accountability/transparency/corruption’ ranks high across all four years, consistently 
ranked #1 or #2. The same is generally true of ‘Education/youth,’ with the exception of 1996. As 
noted earlier however, the small number of grants distributed in 1996 and 2002 urge us to be 
cautious in approaching those samples. In 2002, for example, two projects were funded in each 
of the #1 sectors (resulting in a four-way tie) and one project was funded in each of the #5 
sectors. The difference between primary and secondary sectors, therefore, is rather small. 
Together, ‘Media/accountability/transparency/corruption’ and ‘Education/youth,’ are the clear 
focus of the NGO community across the surveyed time period.  
Projects devote moderate levels of attention to ‘Electoral democracy/elections,’ and, to a 
somewhat lesser degree, ‘Democracy building.’ ‘EU Accession’ projects first appear on the radar 
in 2012, as one would expect (it is likely that projects targeting EU accession were funded in 
2009/10/11, which are omitted from our sample). We might also find higher rates of projects 
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targeting EU accession were we to consider a sample of NGOs funded by a European 
organization or institution. Relatively low levels of attention are paid to ‘Women/Gender’, 
‘Labor’, ‘Minority Rights,’ or ‘Human Rights’ in any of the four years.  
From this NED sample, we cautiously note a generally static state of NGO project focus. 
Between 1996 and 2012, project focus has remained on ‘Education/youth’ and 
‘Media/accountability/transparency/corruption.’ We were unable to identify any sectors that have 
either risen or dropped dramatically in importance. Acknowledging the potential sources of error 
previously identified, it appears that aggregate donor-funded NGO focus has been relatively 
unchanging. A larger sample of NGOs, especially for the early years when the low number of 
grants makes for relatively small differences between primary and secondary sectors, would 
increase the validity of this finding.  
Table 5 NED funded projects 2012 
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Table 6 NED funded projects 2008 
 
Table 7 NED funded projects 2002 
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Table 8 NED funded projects 1996 
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4.0  POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
We began by asking if the Samaritan’s Dilemma might explain the levels of disconnect between 
the Bosnian NGO community and the Bosnian public. In other words, is there evidence that 
Bosnian NGOs changed their behavior, particularly by exerting lower levels of efforts, in 
response to donor presence? To gauge level of effort, we focused on mission evolution. We 
hypothesized that a ‘high effort’ NGO would modify its mission over time in response to 
changing public needs in a changing post-conflict environment. Conversely, a ‘low effort’ NGO 
would be unresponsive to changing community needs and could be identified by the presence a 
rigid, unchanging mission. 
By conducting qualitative interviews with six Bosnian NGOs operating in a diverse range 
of sectors, we identified three separate models pertaining to mission evolution. The first model 
(Stay the Course) describes NGOs whose mission has remained largely unchanged since their 
founding. The second model (Reluctant Evolution) captures NGOs who have consciously, but 
reluctantly, shifting their mission towards donor priorities in order to ensure access to funding. 
To use existing terminology, these NGOs experience donor driven mission drift, although the 
extent to which the decision to shift mission is a conscious one likely varies between NGOs. The 
third category (Catch All Mission) concerns NGOs that lack a clearly articulated mission and are 
therefore prone to a haphazard, ad hoc approach in designing and executing projects. 
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An analysis of NGO projects funded by the National Endowment for Democracy between 
1996 and 2012, focusing on the frequency with which projects were undertaken in different 
sectors, revealed a consistent focus on two sectors: ‘Education/youth’ and 
‘Media/accountability/transparency/corruption.’ However, in light of insights revealed by our 
qualitative data, we are hesitant to brand the lack of sector change as evidence of an 
unresponsive, low effort NGO sector. Evidence suggests that NGOs of the ‘Stay the Course’ 
model maintained their mission because levels of need in that area remained high. Additionally, 
they displayed growth in organizational capacity over time, as well as the ability to adapt tactics 
to changes in the external environment. Both of these characteristics suggest a highly capable 
organization, not one that has reduced its level of effort. Stay the Course NGOs are enabled to do 
so by dependable donor support – otherwise, they are likely to be forced into the ‘Reluctant 
Evolution’ model. Given these observations, we speculate that the NED sample reveals a 
continued high level of need in the ‘Education/youth’ and 
‘Media/accountability/transparency/corruption’ sectors, a need that was recognized by NGOs 
and donors alike. 
The largely qualitative methodology employed here is not sufficient to conclusively 
disprove the influence of the Samaritan’s Dilemma in the Bosnian NGO sector. Further research, 
employing different proxies to measure NGO effort, would be valuable to either confirm these 
findings or to expose evidence of reduced effort. However, based on the results uncovered here, 
we find that the Samaritan’s Dilemma is not a sufficient explanation for the observed disconnect 
between the Bosnian public and the local NGO community. 
Analysis revealed the possibility of an alternative explanation: a missing link between 
NGOs and the public. Qualitative interviews found that most NGOs could not identify a target 
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beneficiary group. Likewise, for all their good intentions, NGO strategic planning lacked 
mechanisms by which to involve or solicit input from the public. In the most extreme case, 
NGOs identify as being part of a global civil society, completely negating the need for a local 
constituency. The result is a grouping of donor-funded NGOs that are ‘leaders without 
followers,’ ill equipped to play their ascribed role as a conduit for civil society. 
Further research is needed to identify 1) the extent of the observed leaders without 
followers phenomena and 2) the underlying causes. Of particular interest is whether the creation 
and subsistence of follower-less NGOs has been facilitated by donor presence.  
4.1 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS: EFFECTIVE NGO/DONOR PARTNERSHIPS 
The central role accorded to NGOs in donor civil society development strategies presumes a 
strong linkage between the NGO and the community. Absent that link, the mechanism by which 
NGO funding fosters civil society is called into question. As such, our policy recommendations 
first require the donors to identify their core objective in NGO funding: support for civil society 
or service delivery. To increase the efficiency of donor aid in the former, we recommend that 
donors incorporate ‘community integration’ in the criteria used to evaluate potential grant 
recipients. Having identified NGOs with strong community linkages, donor funding practices 
should aspire to enable those organizations to follow the ‘Stay the Course’ mission model. This 
shift will likely bring the donor community into contact with the resource-poor marginal NGOs; 
while these organizations possess strong community linkages, donors should proceed cautiously 
so as to avoid undermining those ties. 
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This agenda returns us to the wider definition of civil society, of which formalized NGOs 
are only one part. To date, donors have made increasing efforts to broaden their 
conceptualization of civil society. This shift is apparent in a 2011 EuropeAid policy paper which 
drops the term NGO in preference of the term Non-State Actors (NSAs) and includes the 
mandate to  “mov[e] beyond the ‘usual suspects’ (INGOs, NSA networks in the capital) and 
reach out to smaller NSAs at grassroots level.”  Though reforms to policy and programs lag 
behind shifts in donor rhetoric, the broader definition of civil society is nonetheless significant. 
The existing literature on donor/NGO relationships draws a useful distinction between NGOs 
and membership-based organizations, the latter being “more traditional forms of civil society 
organizations such as social movements, political, or religious institutions, trade unions, 
cooperatives, small self-help groups.”  MBOs are distinct from NGOs in that they are 
accountable to members (rather than staff) and employ a demand-side approach to program 
design. Clearly, there is a high degree of overlap between what we have labeled marginal NGOs 
in the Bosnian case and MBOs. Despite the difference in language, the NGO/MBO distinction is 
largely reflective of the scenario we observe in BiH, with the NGOs being (relatively) well-
funded but lacking grassroots ties and the MBOs rich in grassroots ties but poor in resources and 
influence. Summarizing the existing literature, Banks, Hulem and Edwards offer a series of 
recommendations for increasing NGO effectiveness that call upon the NGOs themselves to 
reconceive of their role. By employing their preexisting strengths – including technical 
knowledge, political advocacy and relationships, and legitimacy – they faciliate a “stronger, 
more inter-connected civil society in which NGOs play a key bridging role between MBOs, local 
and national governments.”  
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Donors’ path forward depends largely on their objectives. NGO funding has traditionally 
been awarded on the basis of project criteria as well as the grantee’s technical and managerial 
capacity. Little effort has been made to assess the existence and strength of the recipient’s 
community integration. If the donor’s core interest is the service that a particular NGO provides, 
then donor funding is not misplaced. If, however, the donor’s ultimate goal is to foster local civil 
society, funding recipients should be selected primarily on the strength of the NGO’s community 
ties and only secondarily on the NGO’s programmatic outputs.  
Decisions of this sort will likely be made on a case-by-case basis. Perhaps human rights 
watchdog organizations are deemed sufficiently foundational to Bosnian democracy to merit 
continued foreign funding, even absent representative ties between the recipient and the 
community. Arguably, the value of these organizations can be compared to the U.S. Institute of 
Peace and the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) – as the public goods they provide are deemed 
fundamental to democracy, the U.S. government bears all or part of the expense. Some Bosnian 
organizations will be assigned this level of importance, others will not. However, in the interest 
of advancing Bosnian civil society, donors must be honest with themselves about which NGOs 
are and are not advancing that objective. 
Where the core objective is to strengthen civil society, donors must develop a mechanism 
to identify NGOs that possess strong community ties. Drawing upon the interview script 
employed in this research, the specificity of an NGO’s reply about its beneficiaries is 
enlightening. Donors might also pose questions about whose voices are included in the NGO’s 
strategic planning process, as well as the criteria used in program design. Direct donor 
observation of these procedures may be necessary to verify NGO responses. The regular use of 
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processes to solicit feedback and opinions from the public is also a positive indicator of 
community integration. 
Expanding the criteria used to evaluate grant applications to include community 
integration is likely to advantage small, local organizations as opposed to the national-level 
NGOs that donors have previously favored. This will include many of the ‘marginal NGOs’ that 
have previously been beyond the inner circle of donor funding. Reaching these NGOs requires 
special considerations, given that many lack the institutional know-how and English language 
skills requisite to complete a grant proposal. Were the donors to accept proposals written in the 
local language, that change alone would significantly expand the field of eligible NGOs. 
Increasingly, internal EU grants may be submitted in any of the official 24 EU languages; 
however, the EU Special Representative of BiH, like other foreign donors, requires that grant/ 
tender applications are written in English. Additionally, foreign donors need to employ a more 
proactive approach in spreading information about available grants. Proactive donor outreach 
combined with simplified application procedures would break the monopoly that large, 
established NGOs have on information and boost applications from small NGOs that possess 
strong local ties but lack paid staff devoted to grant research and writing.    
EU funding, which is notoriously bureaucratically onerous to navigate despite previous 
reform efforts, is especially in need of simplification. The manual entitled “Developing and 
Managing EU-Funded Projects” published by Technical Assistance for Civil Society 
Organisations (TASCO) in 2011 clocks in at 119 pages – hardly navigable for organizations 
lacking a single fulltime paid staff member. An NGO director in Serbia commented that “the 
formal requirements (of the EU) are extensive, and the procedures are demanding. But it is a skill 
like any other. The first time is tough, but when you understand the logic and system of project 
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proposal writing, each time will be easier. It should also be clear that for writing a well-
researched, high-quality project proposal you will need at least two months – six months if you 
are a beginner.”71 Non-professional organizations of the sort most likely to have strong 
grassroots ties do not have the luxury of such resources. The existent donor-imposed barriers of 
entry bar the majority of organizations characterized by high levels of community engagement 
from consideration. 
As they initiate engagement with marginal NGOs, the donor community must exercise 
several cautions. The first is to focus training (if deemed appropriate and beneficial) on measures 
that boost institutional capacity, as opposed to more superficial trainings such as those geared to 
writing mission statements and Logical Frameworks. The success of local NGOs in building civil 
society depends on public engagement, not upon their successful replication of Western 
development paperwork. Western NGOs may be better positioned than Western governments to 
oversee such substance-based knowledge transfer. A twinning program, linking successful local 
Western NGOs with aspiring Bosnian NGOs, could be established.  
The second caution is that donors proceed in a manner that does not inadvertently weaken 
the existing linkages between the NGO and its constituent community. The introduction of 
upward accountability to the donor should not displace downward accountability. As Carothers 
and de Gramont note, there exists a real danger that “to the extent that aid actors support civil 
society groups with strong grassroots connections, their funding can cause these organizations to 
become increasingly responsive to the preferences and needs of donors at the expense of 
accountability to their grassroots members.”72 This scenario can be circumvented by providing 
recipients the freedom and flexibility they need to follow the ‘Stay the Course’ model. By 
providing grant recipients with the necessary latitude to adhere to their own priorities, even when 
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those are not a mirror image of donor priorities, donors can minimize disruptions to downward 
accountability. That is not to say that upward accountability must be neglected; rather, NGO-to-
donor accountability should be reimagined such that an NGO’s success depends on involving 
local community members and responding to their needs. 
By distributing funds on the basis of donor priorities, no matter how well designed and 
intentioned these priorities may be, donors create strong incentives for NGOs to switch to the 
‘Reluctant Evolution’ model. In the short term, this may achieve the donor goal of delivering 
needed services. In the longer term however, it undermines donors’ civil society objectives by 
sacrificing the NGOs’ natural aptitudes and undermining local legitimacy. Donors have already 
begun to abandon the practice of unilaterally setting priorities in favor of local ownership, under 
which “developing countries set their own strategies for poverty reduction, improve their 
institutions and tackle corruption.”73 A 2010 report on donors’ civil society policies and practices 
reported that “it is increasingly recognised that ‘national ownership’ of strategies need to be 
broader than ‘government ownership’, and CSOs are seen as crucial actors in bringing a broader 
notion of citizens’ needs and rights to the table.”74 If a process is in place to verify that recipient 
NGOs possess strong community linkages, donors can be more confident than NGO priorities 
reflect public needs and are less in need of donor instruction. 
Before concluding, we turn briefly to the paths available to NGOs themselves. Those 
NGOs that have fallen victim to the leaders without followers phenomenon face an uphill battle. 
Constituencies are difficult to build retroactively. NGOs typically emerge in a grassroots fashion. 
As they grow, they run the risk of losing touch with their supporters, but there always exists the 
possibility of returning to said constituency. In contrast, the local NGOs profiled here began as 
leaders without followers; they advanced the agenda of a few in the name of societal good. More 
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often than not, the organizational mission was to the benefit of society, but public involvement 
was not sought. Acknowledging the value of their respective causes, the fact remains that leaders 
without followers are NGOs in name only.  
Absent a veritable constituency, many elite NGOs are likely to collapse as donors 
continue their gradual withdrawal from BiH. This is not necessary a negative; the closure of such 
NGOs does not indicate the collapse of civil society, only its veneer. Such closures may even 
have positive spillover effects across the nonprofit sector: it will free up trained and educated 
staff who have long been in the employ of elite NGOs, some of whom will hopefully bring their 
program expertise to the NGOs struggling on the margins. Alternatively, some organizations that 
provide valued and tangible public services – such as CIN – may adapt to the changing 
circumstances by finding a way to monetize their product, perhaps even shifting to a for profit 
model.  
In speaking with NGOs, one hears the refrain that the populace is apathetic and 
disengaged. The February 2014 protests and subsequent plenum movement suggests that this 
assessment overlooks latent changes in Bosnian society. Writing in 2009, CIN highlighted 
several examples that illustrate a frustrated public seeking change, even if they are unsure of the 
mechanisms by which to achieve said change. The article points to several spontaneous anti-
crime demonstrations, as well as the citizen movement ‘Dosta’ (Enough), which played a key 
role in a campaign that led to the ousting of Federation Prime Minister Nedžad Branković on 
corruption charges.75 When bureaucratic bickering prevented newborns from being issued citizen 
ID numbers in summer 2014, thereby preventing them from accessing life saving medical 
treatment abroad, nearly 3,000 citizens staged a sit-in at the National Parliament.76  
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Claims that the events of February 2014 foretold a ‘Bosnian Spring’ were exaggerated. 
Nonetheless, these isolated events suggest that we would be errant to write off the Bosnian 
public as disengaged. In the wake of last year’s protests, The Economist wrote that “Bosnians are 
angry and frustrated with their rulers. They regard their politicians as crooks and thieves, and yet 
when presented with different options … they have not voted for it in significant numbers.”77 
Left adrift, this mounting public frustration is dangerous, likely to manifest in violence as it did 
in February 2014 when protestors set multiple government buildings afire. Mobilizing these 
citizens, especially amidst public suspicion of civil society organizations, is no easy task. That is 
the challenge facing the Bosnian NGO community. Success relies, not upon access to funding, 
but on organizations’ ability to earn and maintain the public’s trust. 
Even as Western donors reduce their presence in Bosnia, they are scaling up in other 
parts of the globe. Whether in crisis zones such as Ukraine and Syria, or in longer-term 
engagement such as Russia and Turkey, civil society promotion is likely to remain a core 
component of democracy promotion strategies overseas. The findings presented here, therefore, 
have wide implications for Western support of nascent NGOs in fledging democracies and 
autocratic regimes. Based on aid outcomes in Bosnia, we see that those organizations self-
identifying as NGOs do not necessarily possess the community ties commonly associated with 
that sector. As such, donor funding decisions based on organizational capacity, project viability 
and finances are insufficient. In order to maximize aid’s impact on civil society, community 
integration should be made a cornerstone in funding decisions. Despite its good intentions, 
international funding for foreign NGOs is a double-edged sword, one that risks not only 
sustaining, but actually fostering, the creation of NGOs detached from the communities they 
purport to serve. 
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